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Abstract
Between 1982 and 2000, the Netherlands experienced a remarkable economie  recovery.
Labour participation rose from a European low of 52 percent to the European average  of 65
percent. Unemployment decreased from a high of 14 percent to a present-day low of 2%
percent, while govemment finances  and social security were reorganised. This paper aims to
demonstrate how the Dutch culture of consensus, reflected in the Dutch institutional
consultation structure, was one of the main  driving forces of this recovery. The trust
enhancing effects of the institutional framework, in which government, unions,  employer
organisations, centra1 bank and advisory bodies meet each other fiequently  in forma1 and
informal atmospheres, produced  an environment of mutual trust and co-operation that was
capable  of effectively dealing with the problems. Two decades of wage moderation and
increased labour market flexibility have led to economie  prosperity without significant social
unrest. It is an example of an institutional fiamework  that transforms trust between persons
and organisations at the micro  leve1 to positive macroeconomic effects.
Keywords: labour market policy, institutional framework, networks, trust
1. Introduction
Between 1982 and 2000, the Netherlands experienced a remarkable economie  recovery. Some
people even speak of a “Dutch miracle” and hold the so-called “Polder model” responsible.
Highlights are the increase of labour participation from a by international standards relatively
low 52 percent to the European average  of 65 percent, and the decrease in unemployment
from a high of 14 percent to a present-day low of 2% percent. Furthermore, government
finances  turned from a 9 percent deficit to a smal1 surplus and the social security system was
drastically reorganised.
Several explanations have been given for this miraculeus  recovery. This paper focuses on the
role of the specific  Dutch institutional framework of social-economie  policy preparation as a
driving force of the recovery. The Dutch culture of consensus finding  in combination with the
institutional consultation structure in which government, unions,  employer organisations,
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centra1 bank and advisory bodies meet each other frequently  in forma1 and informal
atmospheres, produced  an environment of mutual trust and co-operation that was capable  of
effectively dealing with the problems of the economy.
The concept of trust becomes relevant for economie  analysis when  one drops the standard
assumption of perfect and free information and takes care of the notion of bounded rationality.
In a situation of imperfect and asymmetrie  information, which is typical for the policy making
process, it is impossible to write  complete and legally binding contracts.  This offers the
possibility of opportunistic behaviour by transaction partners. This means  that agents can gain
extra benefits at the expense of their transaction partners (Williamson, 1985). In these
situations, trustworthiness is regarded as the characteristic of the party that refrains from
opportunistic behaviour. Trust is the expectation of a party that the other party wil1  behave
trustworthy. It favours co-operation. The combination of game theory and the practica1
problem of co-ordination  between different parties at the labour market shows that - in
genera1 - parties wil1  be better off if they co-ordinate  polities than they would be in the Nash
uncooperative equilibrium in which each party sets its polities while taking those of the
others as given.
A major advantage of building trust by co-operation of unions  and employer associations is
that hold-up problems can be prevented. Two decades of co-operation between unions  and
employer federations in the Netherlands have crystallised into a sustained combined  strategy
of lowering wage costs, increased labour market flexibility and investment in employment.
Although this strategy involved twenty years of wage moderation (during which profïts of
firms  were restored), social unrest in the form of strike activity has been negligible. Although
wage moderation in The Netherlands can be seen as just the Phillips-curve effect in reaction
to high unemployment, a major argument of our paper is that this sustained co-operative
stance can only be explained in terms of high mutual trust between the negotiating parties of
labour standards. The institutional framework  can in this way be seen as the intermediary
element that transforms  trust between persons  and organisations at the micro  leve1 (often
found in microeconomic game experiments) to positive macroeconomic effects.
Yet, in spite of the enhanced labour participation, and in spite of various reforms of the social
security system, demand  for social security benefits remained high in the Netherlands,
especially with respect to labour disability, where  a considerable  part of the receivers of
benefits are unemployed in disguise. Hence, this outcome of the reforms in the social security
system shows a remarkable discrepancy between the behaviour of social partners in the wage
setting process and their management of social security. The first  can be considered highly
responsible and praiseworthy, the second is a clear  example of rent-seeking behaviour. In the
constellation where on the one hand social partners had to decide about the implementation of
the social security system, and on the other hand government had to bear al1 costs,  social
partners fi-ustrated  the workings of the system by using it as a “dump” for less-productive
workers. In that way they took no interest in the costs for society. This may be a lesson that a
co-operative  stance in one field of policy does not form a guarantee for joint utility
maximising behaviour in other fields.  The institutional structure  must always be given the
shape that intemalises al1 extemal effects  in the decision procedure.
The content of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of the main
characteristics of the transition hom  the Dutch disease to the Dutch miracle. The main
institutions and their role in the “Polder” model are discussed  in section 3. In this discussion,
a special emphasis is laid on the trust enhancing aspects of this institutional fmrnework.
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Section 4 explains the relevante  of trust for the efficient  fùnctioning of labour markets  in
some more detail. After  the treatment of the theoretical model, we show the appropriateness
of the model for the Dutch (labour) market. In section 5, we confront the fïndings  of the
earlier sections with the actual interaction of the policy makers in the Dutch institutional
setting. The Wassenaar agreement and the main  policy measures that are held responsible for
the economie  recovery are analysed in the light of trust between the main  players and the
theoretical model discussed  in section 4. Section 6 concludes.
2. From Dutch disease to Dutch miracle
The post-war period until 1963 can be characterised by strong GDP growth, full employment
and, because of govemment wage control,  modest wage increases. After  the period of
reconstruction which ended in the mid 1950’s the Dutch economy  was characterised by
former Minister Andriessen (1987) as an economie  eldorado. It was a period of Keynesian
demand  management, with hardly any  cyclical downturns.
The system of govemment wage control more or less stops functioning after  1963. This is
caused by pressure from the market - where  labour shortages lead to “black wages” - and
fiom  social partners (labour unions  and employer associations) who  want to stop government
interventions in “their” labour market. The gradient release of wage setting comes at the same
time  with the transition to a modem welfare state by expanding social security with a number
of provisions which, later, prove to be very  generous (see table 1). The discovery and
exploitation of large stocks of natura1 gas contribute  to the politica1 belief that such a generous
and extensive system is sustainable and can be financed.
Table 1: Social security, main legal  provisions
Employee insurance
1930 Sickness Act (ZW)
1949 Unemployment Act (WW)
Income  loss due to sickness
Income  loss due to
unemployment
1964 Sickness Fund Act (ZFW) Covers medical expenses
1967 Disability Act (WAO) Income  loss due to disability
National insurance
1957 Genera1 Old Age Act (AOW) Old age pension
1959 Genera1 Widows and Orphans Act (AWW), replaced Pension for widows,
by Genera1 Survivors Act (Anw) in 1996 widowers and orphans
1963 Genera1 Child Allowance Act (AKW) Child allowance
1967 Genera1 Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) Exceptional medical expenses
1976 Genera1 Disability Act (AAW) Disability for others than
employees
Social provisions
1965 Genera1 Social Assistance Act (Abw), replaced in 1996 Social assistance
by new Genera1 Social Assistance Act
The oil shock of 1973 marks the end of this period. The shock leads to high energy prices and,
through the automatie  price  compensation, to a proportional rise in wages and benefit  levels.
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The guilder remains strong because of the revenues  from the export of gas. This worsens the
competitive position, which hinders exports and depresses the exposed sector. The economie
problems in is period have become known as the Dutch disease. So, prices  and wages
increase, and profits  are squeezed. Unemployment starts to rise (and nearly does not decline
in the period between the oil shocks) and the Keynesian expansion policy of the govemment
now leads to rising budget deficits. The second oil shock (1979-1980) worsens the situation
even more. The wage share in market sector income - the share of the added value that
accrues to the factor of labour and is therefore not available for capita1 costs - increases to 95
percent (see @ure  1). Unemployment reaches a high of about 14 percent in the beginning of
the eighties. The government tries to enforce  wage restraints by intervening with mandates on
wages, but these are not very  successful  in this period.
Figure 1: wage income share market sector (in percentage of GDP)
100
Source:  CPB, Centraal  Economisch Plan 2001.
Finally, in 1982, labour unions  and employer associations reach agreement on a policy of
voluntary wage restraint and redistribution of work in order to restore profïts  and fight
unemployment in the so-called Wassenaar agreement. This agreement marks the start of a
period of relative wage moderation (e.g. vis-à-vis real wages in Germany) which results in a
considerable  decrease in the labour-income ratio. In section  4 we discuss  türther  how the
agreement acts as a major first  step in the transition from the Dutch disease to the Dutch
miracle. This switch in policy and its acceptance are more or less initiated by insights of the
economie  profession that Keynesian demand  management is no longer  an adequate policy
receipt to combat stagflation. It becomes understood that the negative supply effects  of wage
rises are, through lower profïts  and worsening of the competitive position, stronger than the
positive demand  effects.
The start of the Lubbers Cabinet in 1982 also marks a switch in fiscal policy. The gradual
expansion of the public sector (centra1 govemment, local govemment and social insurance)
comes to an end and the govemment budget deficit declines from 8.6% in 1983 to smal1
surphtses  in 1999 and 2000 (see figure  2). The strict budgetary policy results in a decline of
the share of taxes and social security premiums and the share of public expenditures in GDP
between 1983 and 2000, namely from 47.4 to 41.4% and 58 to 40.0%3.
3 CPB, Centraal Economisch Plan 2001.
Figure 2: government budget, the Netherlands
Source: CBS, Stutistical  Yembook,  SDU publishers, The Hague.
This policy of budget constraint is enforced by two developments. First, employment in the
public sector decreases from 15% to 11.7% of total employment, while the wages of civil
servants stay largely behind market developments. Putting the index for (nominal) contractual
wages at 100 for base year 1980, wages in the private sector rise to 170 in 1999, while
workers in the public sector see their income  rise to 1374.  In real terms, hourly wages in the
public sector stil1 are in 1999 almost  15 percent below their 1980 leve1 (see figure 3).
Remarkably this happens  without serious unrest among the govemment personnel, although
union  density is relatively high in the public sector. The second  source of budget
improvement comes from reduction in expenditures on social security - particularly because
of lower benefit  levels and not so much  because of a reduction in the number of benefit
receivers.
.
4 CBS, Statistical  Yearbook, SDU publishers, The Hague.
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Figure 3: Real  hourly wages (1980 = 100)
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Source: CBS, Stutistical Yeurbook,  1970-2000, SDU Publishers, The Hague
Yet, the most noticeable change in the Dutch economy  is the decline in unemployment from
about 14 percent in 1983 to 2%  percent at the end of 2000 (see fígure  4). Especially the fact
that other European countries that used to experience the same cyclical circumstances as the
Netherlands stil1 write  double digits for their unemployment performance makes this
remarkable. However,  official unemployment fïgures  are not fully comparable between
countries. In the Netherlands, people above 57 years old don’t count as registered
unemployed, because they are no longer  obliged to search actively for a job since 1983.
Another typical Dutch arrangement is the widespread use of early retirement, which also
distracts older workers fï-om  the labour force. Above this, the Dutch disability benefït  scheme
attracts two to three times  more people than it does in other countries: part of these receivers
of a disability bene&  can be regarded as unemployed in disguise, especially as the disability
scheme  is more generous than the unemployment scheme  (Aarts, Burkhauser and De Jong
(1996),  Hassink (1997),  Lindeboom (1992)). These three options for a comfortable  early exit
have resulted in a very  low participation rate for elderly in the Netherlands.
.
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Figure 4: Unemployment (percentage of labour force)
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Source: ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics.
Although the unemployment fígures look a little less spectacular  given these considerations,
the fïgures  about employment are far more conclusive,  and again underline the economie
miracle. From 1984 on, employment growth is clearly above European average  and
comparable to the results of the American job machine (see fïgure  5). Labour participation
rises íTorn  an European low of 52 percent in 1983 to 65 percent, which is about European
average.
Figure 5: Annual employment growth
.
- Netherlands - - - - - - Belgium - France ----UK- w w -US
Source: ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics.
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3. Institutions, consultation structure  and effects on trust
In the preceding section we gave an overview of the transition - from Dutch disease to Dutch
miracle - that took place  in the Dutch economy.  In this section we focus on the specific  Dutch
institutional fiamework  that, in our eyes, made this recovery possible. We pay attention to
peculiarities of the Dutch society as the “drive for consensus” and “pillarisation”, and how
these are reflected in the institutional setting. Afier  the discussion of the various players in the
field of economie  policy making,  we pay attention to some specific  legislation on labour
standards negotiations to get a better understanding of the functioning  of the Dutch labour
market. Throughout the whole  section, a special focus is laid on the trust enhancing effects of
the institutional framework. In section 4, we explain why trust is important for economie
policy.
Consensus and pillarisation
The drive for consensus is often considered as a dominant social characteristic in The
Netherlands. Its origin may even be the Dutch historie  context of the struggle against the
water. Already  in the twelfth  century public boards came  into being to organise protection
against the sea and initiate land-winning procedures. This common interest forced people to
co-operate with each other and to reach a compromise,  or preferably a consensual agreement,
in order to be able to defend themselves against the danger of floods in al1 circumstances.
Moreover, for the farming in “polders” agreement is needed on the leve1 of the ground water
and on good maintenance of the dikes and ditches.
This idea of consensus formation as dominant social characteristic was, in a portentous way,
combined  with another peculiarity of the Dutch society, namely its “pillarisation”. During the
twentieth century until the seventies, the Dutch society was separated into four “spheres of
influence”, i.e. into four separate “pillars”, namely catholic, protestant, socialist and liberal.
These four pillars had their own schools, newspapers, broadcasting companies,  sport clubs
and politica1 parties. For a large part, people communicated with each other only within each
pillar. At the leve1 of government, however,  the leaders of the different pillars did not hesitate
to contact each other and form coalition govemments. These coalition govemments are a
necessity in The Netherlands, where  the politica1 parties originally represented the various
pillars. It has never happened that a single party obtained a majority in parliament. This
system of coalition govemments forces the different politica1 streams to work together, reach
compromises and, even better, consensus.
This drive for consensus and pillarisation constitutes  the background for the institutional
framework for (economie)  policy formation in The Netherlands. An insight in the working of
these institutions is crucial for the understanding of how the trust enhancing effects of this
institutional framework have contributed to the Dutch miracle.
Centra1 Planning Bureau
A crucial role in this institutional set-up is played by the Dutch Centra1 Planning Bureau
(CPB) which has now renamed itself in English as The CPB Netherlands Bureau for Policy
Analysis  (CPB) as it does not want to be associated with economie  planning in the sense of
the socialist economies.  Yet, it was founded in 1948 originally as a centra1 planning bureau
for economie  affairs, with Tinbergen as the first  directer.
In spite of the fact that the CPB is formally part of the Ministry of Economie  Affairs, it fulfils
its advisory task independent from government interference. This status of independente  is
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recognised by al1 parties and stakeholders in the policy making  process, which has provided
the analyses of the CPB with high reputation and esteem.  The two major periodic publications
of the CPB are the Centra1 Economie  Plan (CEP) and the Macroeconomic Outlook (MEV).
The Centra1 Economie  Plan is published each year in springtime and contains a survey and
analysis of economie  developments in the Netherlands and abroad. The CEP also contains
economie  forecasts for the current year. The MEV is published together with the government
budget in September each year and contains the forma1 forecasts of the economy in the next
year, on which the govemment budget has to be based. Moreover, the MEV gives revised
projections for the current year.
In fact the CPB nowadays has two major tasks. The first is that of national auditor: this
implies economie  forecasting and assessment of the effects  of policy measures for the
govemment and for other groups involved in the policy making  process. The second task of
the CPB has remained, up to now, somewhat underexposed. It is that the CPB conducts, in the
more genera1 sense, applied economie  research (see Don, 1996).
CPB’s reputation of independente  has been challenged from time  to time  both in academia
and by the press, especially with respect to its task of forma1 auditor for the govemment. Here
the position of the CPB is in fact that of a monopolist and it is true that the CPB has a special
position, as it has access to confídential information on govemment policy. This position is
needed in order to be able to react promptly on questions by policymakers, which mainly
regard  technical and accounting aspects in policy discussions. Yet, in the institutional
framework for policy making  in the Netherlands a nurnber of checks and balances have been
built in order to prevent the CPB to misuse its monopoly position. Such misuse would also
immediately destroy much  of the reputation that the bureau has built up so caretülly.  Besides
it is a question of efficiency to have, in a relatively smal1 country as the Netherlands, only one
institute which is responsible for this kind of macroeconomic forecasting and policy
evaluations. This task requires a lot of specifïc investments and hence the institute has to be
quite  sizeable. It is typical for the institutional set-up of Dutch policy making  that there are
numerous  forma1 and informal contacts  between the staff of the CPB and the economists at
ministries, researchers in academia  and the staff of the social partners. On the one hand they
provide  relevant information to the CPB, but, on the other hand, they will, if needed, be
critical on the work of the CPB.
The CPB does not hold a monopoly position for its second task, namely that of institute of
applied economie  research. Here, it competes both with other Dutch institutes and with
institutes abroad. Nowadays the CPB is asked more frequently  than before to give a second
opinion on research conduct by other institutes. Moreover, intemational organisations such as
the OECD, the staff of the European Commission and the IMF publish periodical forecasts for
the Dutch economy.
Since the CPB’s first directer  Tinbergen (1936) has built the first econometrie  policy model it
is understandable that model based policy analysis has, from the origin, constituted an
important part of the work of the CPB. The CPB’s ‘model’ early acquired a high status in
academie  circles and has come  to be regarded in Dutch society as an objective  piece of
economie  science (Den Butter and Morgan, 1998). The analyses of the CPB are widely used
as input for social economie  policy discussions. However, in the first few years of the CPB
there was a fíerce  intemal discussion in the CPB about the way the bureau should give shape
to its advises (see Van den Bogaard, 1998). On the one side was Van Cleeff, who had the
view that the CPB should follow a normative approach, while on the other side Tinbergen
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supported the idea of disentangling the positive and normative elements of the analyses.
Crucial  in this controversy  was in which way economie  policy advice  would be the most
successful in the “pillarised” economy. Van Cleeff tried to develop an all-embracing
normative theory which would integrate the ideas of the different pillars. Tinbergen wanted to
develop a method that would give the most objective  description of reality. The differences
between the pillars would then be minimised to their different normative proportions. In other
words, he wanted to make a clear  distinction between the workings of the economy (model)
and the policy goals (welfare functions), and then “try to agree on the first and compromise on
the second issue”. Tinbergen won this battle. Since then, economie  policy preparation in the
Netherlands is organised in three autonomous parts: data, model and norms. The data and
statistics  are collected  by the Centra1 Bureau for Statistics  (CBS), the workings of the
economy are described by the models of the CPB and the balancing of different points of
view is done by the govemment in dialogue with unions,  employer organisations and other
associations of organised interest. This method of splitting facts and politics  seems to be the
best in creating consensus in a pillarised society.
A major and unique example of this functioning of the CPB in policy consensus (or rather
compromise) formation is that, in years in which genera1 elections for parliament take place,
the major politica1 parties ask the CPB to calculate  the effects  of their election  programs for
economie  growth, employment, income  distribution and so on. The results for the different
politica1 parties are widely spelled out in newspapers and television programs. Seemingly it is
almost  a realisation of Tinbergen’s dream to separate the knowledge on the working of the
economy, which is contained  in the models used by the CPB, and the normative preferences
on trade-offs between policy goals, which wil1  differ for each politica1 party (or pillar). In fact
this procedure has proofed benefïcial in the formation of coalition governments and in
drafting  the “government agreement” that is signed by the various politica1 parties who co-
operate in the coalition government. In the discussions after  the elections, when a new
govemment has to be formed, those policy measures put forward by the various politica1
parties have the best chance  to be included in the govemment agreement that have, according
to the calculations of the CPB, the largest favourable effects  on the major policy goals.
However,  this procedure may  bring about some questionable side effects.  Firstly the CPB wil1
not include the various policy proposals by the politica1 parties at face value in their model
calculations, but there is ample interaction and discussion between the party officials who
write  the economie  sections in their politica1 programs, and the staff of the CPB who
implements the proposals in their models. So this exercise of the CPB may lead to revisions of
the proposals by the politica1 parties before they are published in their fïnal programs. A
second, even more questionable side effect is that the economists of the politica1 parties have
become familiar with the properties of the models of the CPB and will, in their policy
proposals, see to it that they are effective  in terms of the CPB models. In fact a bad
performance in the CPB calculations, especially with respect to employment, can lead to a
large loss of votes in the elections. The result  is that this procedure made the policy proposals
of the politica1 parties to be very  much  in line with proposals which are benefícial according
to the models of the CPB. So it has led to a remarkable convergente  of policy plans, which
contributed to the lack of interest of the Dutch population for genera1 elections - apart from
“depillarisation” which may be another course. Moreover, there is a risk that the way the CPB
models describe economie  reality is not correct, so that al1 politica1 parties are begging for the
wrong horse in the design of their programs. This would imply an extraordinary example of a
politica1 lock-in.
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Cen  tral Bank
The second  institution which traditionally plays a major role in macroeconomic policy is the
Dutch Centra1 Bank: the Netherlands Bank (DNB). The forma1 task of DNB is to conduct
monetary policy in order to combat inflation and to keep the value of the money stable. The
Dutch Centra1 Bank has always been quite  independent from govemment intervention so that
it can traditionally be ranked amongst the world’s most independent centra1 banks. On the
other hand, the role of DNB in the policy discussions in the Netherlands is not restricted to
monetary policy; DNB takes part in the most prominent forums for policy discussion in the
Dutch Polder model. The advice  and policy analysis of DNB are wel1  respected and carry a
large weight. Moreover, there is ample informal co-ordination  with fiscal policy: the President
of DNB has regular lunches with the Minister of Finance and the Treasurer General,  who is a
highly ranked civil servant at his ministry. The exchange rate  policy of DNB also played an
important role in economie  recovery. The monetary policy of fixing the value of the Dutch
guilder to that of the German Mark can be seen as a major contribution to the success of the
policy of wage moderation. In this way, the relative decrease of labour costs in the
Netherlands due to the policy of wage restraint, was not sterilised by a nomina1 appreciation
of the guilder. As a result  the Dutch guilder depreciated in real terms, which was beneficial  to
the international competitive  position.
Foundation of Labour
It is typical for the Dutch Polder model that the social partners are at the heart of the
consultation structure  for economie  and social policy. The “Foundation of Labour” (STAR) is
the forma1 platform where  employees and employers meet each other on a structural basis. It
was founded in 1945 as a private organisation and acts as a bilateral forum of discussion for
unions  and employer associations in the field of labour standards. The seats are equally
divided between the two, and both sides deliver one of the two chairmen. The results of the
discussions are stated in “centra1 agreements”. This occurs about once in two or three years.
Social Economie Council
Yet the major forum for politica1 discussions which is associated  with the Dutch Polder
model, is the Social Economie  Council (SER). The SER is the main  policy advisory board of
the government for social economie  matters. Its constellation is tripartite. Labour unions,
employer associations and independent “members of the crown”  each posses one third of the
seats. There are three important labour union  federations: the socialist/catholic  FNV, the
protestant CNV and the MHP for middle and higher  ranked personnel/managers.  Nation-wide
union  membership rate  is about 27 percent, of which 64 percent belongs to the FNV, 19
percent to the CNV, 11 percent to the MHP and 6 percent to other unions’.  There are also
three employer federations at the centra1 level. The most important is the VNO-NCW, which
acts as a representative for al1 employers. Members of this federation are both individual fïrms
and lower leve1 employer organisations, often organised by industry. MKB  and LTO are the
representatives for respective  firms  of middle and smal1 size, and fïrms  in the agricultural
sector. The “members of the crown”  consist of professors of university faculties of economics
and law, politicians, the president of the Dutch Centra1 Bank and the directer  of the CPB.
It is through these independent members that the policy discussions within the SER benefït
from the insights of scientific  research. The analyses of the CPB and DNB carry a large
weight in these discussions. Policy advises by the SER are prepared in committees  where
representatives of the three categories  discuss  and amend texts drafted by the Secretariat of
5 These CBS data relate to January  2001.
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the SER. Representatives of various ministries attend these meetings of the committees  but
formally they are observers. They wil1  not take part in discussions unless they are asked to
provide  relevant information. Obviously it is important for the impact of the advises of the
SER that they are unanimous. It is quite  exceptional that the govemment would disregard a
unanimous policy advice  of the SER. The independent members of the crown (which, by the
way, represent the various pillars in the Dutch society) can, in informal discussions, be helpful
in reaching such a consensus advice. A major role in this situation is played by the chairman
of the SER, who is also an independent member, and understandably has a crucial  position in
the institutional set-up of the Dutch Polder model.
The SER has an important function in promoting trust between the various policy makers by
acting  as a platform of discussion for social partners, government, centra1 bank, CPB and
scientists. The positive role of the SER has, however,  not always been recognised by the
govemment. The legal provision that the government was obliged to ask the SER for advice
on al1 proposals for social-economie  legislation was abolished in 1995. The feeling had arisen
at the government leve1 that this procedure took too much  time  and caused too much
“stickiness” in the policy preparation procedures. However,  instead of weakening the position
of the SER in the process of policy preparation, this measure seems to have strengthened it.
The measure worked, probably unintended by the government, as a trigger mechanism  for the
members of the SER to reach consensus in its policy recommendations. Recommendations
that are signed unanimously by the three parties involved give a strong signal to the
govemment of societal consensus on specifïc policy measures, and are therefore much  more
powerfùl than recommendations that reflect divided opinions. As mentioned above, the Dutch
culture of consensus puts strong pressure on the govemment to follow unanimous
recommendations. The govemment is, however,  not bound to act in the way the SER
recommends, although it is obliged to give a forma1 reaction statement at every  published
advice.
The SER thus fulfils two main  purposes. First, it works as a device  for the govemment to get
informed about the points of view of employee and employer organisations about social-
economie  questions. Especially the unanimous recommendations give the government clues
about what policy measures wil1  be supported by society. Second, the SER works as a
platform that brings together employee and employer organisations to talk with each other
about social-economie  matters. The presence of economie  and legal scientists makes sure that
the discussions are based on solid arguments. In this way they learn about each motives and
objectives  for and against certain policy measures. This prevents misunderstandings and can
form a basis for developing mutual trust.
One of the major aspects in the negotiations in the SER, which is related to the idea of trust, is
that the main  negotiators meet each other regularly both in forma1 and in informal meetings.
So it is the repeated game aspect of trust formation which plays an important role here. An
example of this attitude can be found in an interview by Arjo Klamer  (1990) on the occasion
of the 40th  anniversary of the SER. Klamer  posed the following question to Jan Stekelenburg,
at that time  the chairman of FNV, the largest trade tmion.  ‘My impression is that you and Van
Lede - chairman of the largest employers organisation - are very  much  on speaking terms and
that you are more friendly to each other than the outside world believes you are.’
Stekelenburg’s answer is: ‘NO, no, that is not true! It is certainly not true that we’re constantly
fíghting with each other, but at the moment of conflict it is clear and apparent and we don’t
ease the problem when we are together.’ Then Klamer  asked: ‘Did it happen that you were
really angry with Van Lede?’ Stekelenburg replied: ‘Yes, when there is really a large conflict
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1 may  be angry. However,  it wil1  happen in a way which does not harm our future
relationship, because we are condemned to each other. We need each other in these
negotiations on labour relations, so that we should be aware that after  a big quarrel we wil1
always be forced to come  back to business in a next situation. So the real hard and definite
battle wil1 never be fought.’
Committees
A fiuther  major role in this technocratie  process of economie  policy preparation is played,
albeit somewhat outside the spotlights of attention, by committees inside the ranks and files of
the govemment. The “Council for Economie  Affairs” (REA) and the “Centra1 Economie
Committee” (CEC), are especially influential in this respect. The CEC consists of highly
ranked civil servants from the key ministries involved in economie  and social policy. The
committee  is chaired by the secretary genera1 of the Ministry of Economie  Affairs and it is
through discussions in this committee  that calculations by the CPB have inspired to major
changes  in economie  policy (see Den Butter, 1991). Incidentally, when  no consensus can be
reached about difficult policy problems in the institutional framework sketched  above, special
committees are established for policy advice  on these problems. A recent example (2001) is
the committee  chaired by Donner, former chairman of the Scientifïc Council for Government
Policy and member of the “State  Council”, which is asked to provide  a new design for the
social security arrangements for disabled workers (WAO).
kient@  Council
A danger that threatens the close consultation structure  as it exists in the Netherlands is that it
is susceptible  to inertia,  and even to lock-ins so that radical changes  wil1  never be initiated. In
order to get out of such a situation, it sometimes helps if an outsider rings the alarm bell. This
has become one of the functions of the Scientifïc Council for Government Policy (WRR). The
WRR was founded in 1972 to provide  advice to the govemment about long-term polities.
Though this multidisciplinary Scientific  Council is not a really a part of the consultation
structure  of the Dutch labour market, its reports are among the most influential social-
economie  analyses.
Parliament
After  al1 consultations in the institutions in the Polder model have been conducted, it is, of
course, in the democratie  state of the Netherlands in the end always the parliament that
decides about policy measures proposed by the government. Yet the outcome of the
consultations wil1  always carry a large weight in the voting behaviour of the members of
parliament.
Wage negotiations
It is not only in the structure  of organised meetings in the STAR and SER and other platforms
that trust between policy maker is improved. Also the genera1 structure  and legal environment
of the wage negotiations give incentives to the different parties to co-operate and reach
consensus. We fïrst  take a look at these features of the wage negotiations at the centra1 level,
after that we continue with negotiations at industry and firm level.
.
At the centra1 level, two times  a year a fixed  consultation process between government and
social partners takes place. These are called the “spring”- and “autumn’‘-consultation. These
are again two moments when official meetings between govemment and social partners take
place, but the process also favours trust within the organisations, as wil1  be clarifïed below.
Starting-point for the spring-consultation is the new plan for the govemment budget, the
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autumn-consultation marks the beginning of a new round of wage negotiations. The
preparations for the yearly cycles  of wage negotiations start in the two largest federations of
unions  (also see Teulings and Hartog, 1998: 281). The biggest employee federation, the FNV,
uses the macro-economie forecasts of the CPB to calculate  the “wage bargaining space”. This
concept describes the reasonable wage tost  increase and is usually calculated as the sum of
inflation and change in labour productivity. Note that it is not defïned in what detïnitive  form
this wage space should be realised (wage increase, labour time  reduction, schooling,  fiinge
benefits).  Together with other wishes,  this is written  down in a document and then discussed
with the chairmen of al1 member unions.  The other big federation (CNV) follows a procedure
that is quite  similar. Apart fiom  this consensus and consultation approach, the centra1 strike
fund serves as a way to promote  unity  in union  federations. Only unions  that strike in line
with federation bargaining positions can receive  support trom this centra1 stike fund. These
are two ways to keep member unions  and the federation at the same line of polities.
Employer organisations also co-ordinate  their bargaining positions for the new wage
negotiations. The Committee for the Preparation of Wage Polities  prepares the fundamental
principles  for the negotiations in each year. A genera1 strike fund  is open for members that are
hit by strikes  that deal about fundamental  issues discussed by the Committee.
Incentives for co-operation  are also present in negotiations at the industry and fïrrn level. To
make this clear, we fïrst  have to take a somewhat closer  look at the regulation of collective
labour agreements. Two laws regulate the completion of collective  labour agreements. First,
the Law on the Collective  Agreement of 1927 stipulates that the terms of a collective
agreement are binding for al1 workers in the fírm,  not just members of the union  signing the
agreement. Second, the Law on Mandatory Extension of 1937 gives the right to the Minister
of Social Affairs to extend a collective  agreement to the entire industry. To get extension, one
of the bargaining parties must send a request to the Minister, who  checks some forma1 criteria.
The most important is that the collective  agreement must cover a substantial majority of the
industry. The maximum duration of an extension is two years.
There are several features in the system of wage bargaining that give incentives to al1 unions
to sign an agreement and to the employers to sign an agreement  with al1 unions  (also see
Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). By making  it favourable for al1 parties to reach an agreement,
these incentives stimulate the formation of consensus and trust. Because an agreement can
only be reached when standpoints come  together, this incentive structure  also favours the
moderation of demands and wishes  of the parties and thereby promotes “reasonable”
outcomes.
An important incentive comes from the fact that employers are free to start negotiations with
any union,  but are not obliged to do so. Firms are not legally bound to acknowledge any
union.  The law of 1927 states türther  that when the employer signs an agreement with any
union,  this agreement fùnctions as the agreement for al1 employees, regardless of their
eventual membership of this or another union.  So, at any moment, anyone can start a union  of
his own and every  union  can try to get in negotiation with the employer. Unions  are allowed
by court to strike to reach this purpose. This means  that unions  always run the risk of being
excluded from labour negotiations by the employer. This sometimes even occurs to the most
important unions,  so it is a credible threat. The main  reasons why unions  want to be involved
in the negotiations are threefold. The first  reason is of course that they want to reach
something for their members. They have no reason of existente  if they’re not the sparring
partner of the employer. The second reason is that only the unions  that have signed the
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agreement are entitled to the rights that come  forth out of the agreement. The third reason is
that the unions  that have signed the agreement receive  a fíxed  amount of money per worker in
the fírm/industry,  to be divided between the different unions  in proportion to their respective
amount of members. The combination of these three reasons with the possibility of exclusion
gives unions  incentives to form coalitions with other unions  and mitigate their claims. They
are very  wel1  aware that the party with the most extreme claims bears the highest risk to be
excluded.
The employers also face an incentive to include as many  as possible unions  in the
negotiations. Collective  labour agreements usually contain a clause  that forbids the unions  to
organise or support strikes  during the time  period the agreement is valid. Since, of course,
only the unions  that signed the agreement have to obey this clause,  the employers have an
incentive to get the agreement signed by as many  unions  as possible.
Trust evaluation
Looking at the Dutch institutional fiamework  for social-economie  policy preparation, we
notice  that it has several characteristics that favour the formation of trust and co-operation.  To
begin with, there seems to be a character trait or culture prevalent in the Netherlands that is
favourable to co-operation  and consensus, possibly descending from a joint fíght  against the
water. With other words, there seems to be a sort of “basic  trust” upon which actual mutual
trust can be developed. This can also be related to the idea of the path-dependency of trust
(see for example Putnam,  1993). Given the fact that most people in a society fee1 inclined to
act in trustworthy ways, it is beneficial  for al1 people to keep to this way of transacting,
because it wil1  raise extra benefïts  for the involved parties by being able to solve co-ordination
type of games. However,  when most people in a society are used to act in uncooperative
ways, every  individual must distrust  other people in order not to be exploited. In this way, the
leve1 of trust at a given date in a society has its effects  for trust in the future. The inherent co-
operative stance of the Dutch thus favours the formation of trust.
A second  characteristic is that people are aware of an extemal threat and their own
vulnerability. This extemal threat used to be the water but nowadays seems to be replaced by
foreign competition. The inhabitants of smal1 open economies  have to fïnd  ways to deal with
this without the option of protectionism.  This demands co-operation of al1 interests in society.
This is reflected in the way policy preparation is organised. The structure  can be regarded as
corporatist, in which government and organised interest together search for solutions.
“[Olrganised  interest does not have to lobby, they are welcome  partners in the conference
room” (Hartog, 1999: 8). The third characteristic is thus formed by the fmmework  of
institutionalised contacts  between government, social partners, centra1 bank, CBS, CPB and
advisory boards. The representatives of al1 these groups meet each other fi-equently,  both in
forma1 (meetings of the SER, STAR, spring- and autumn-consultation, CEC, REA) and
informal occasions (receptions, farewell parties, etc.). These frequent contacts  culminate  into
better information exchange and thereby prevent misunderstandings. But this network with a
relatively low number of players and a high meeting frequency is also very  favourable for the
formation of trust. The Dutch institutional framework  seems to fit almost  completely with
micro  fïndings  on how to build trust-enhancing networks. The group of players is relatively
small. As we have seen ti-om  the interview by Klamer  (1990) there is a lot of repeated
contacts between the players. A substantial part of it is face-to-face and informal (see e.g.
Ostrom and Walker (1997) for an analysis of public good games in which face-to-face
communication leads to substantial increases in co-operation). Every  player belongs to an
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organisation, so reputations can be smoothly transferred ti-om  one representative of the
organisation to the other. With other words, a reputation of trustworthiness does not disappear
(completely) when  individual persons  are replaced. Reputations are important, because
policy-making  is a dynamic  process. Organisations meet each other over and over again, and
know that this wil1
legally binding contracts, which opens the way for opportunism: people can gain short-term
benetïts  by cheating. The combination of opportunism and specifïc  investments can lead to
hold-up problems (Williamson, 1985). Specificity of an investment means  that the value of an
investment is directly dependent from the continuation of the relationship. An example of a
specific investment is a firm investing in the skills of an employee while these skills are only
valuable in this specific fïrm.  The effect of this investment is that the labour productivity of
the employee in this firm is raised. As long as the employee stays within the firm,  the
investment leads to extra rents (to be divided between firm and employee). When the
employee leaves the fïrrn,  these gains are lost. This gives additional bargaining power to the
employee, because he can threaten to leave the firm.  The lack of complete contracts hinders in
this case mutually advantageous trade. Though there are profitable investments to be made,
potential investors refrain  Com doing so, because they are afraid  that their transaction partner
wil1  hold them up.
A solution for this problem is to allocate  ex-post (after  the investment has been done)
bargaining power to the party that carries  out the investment. The obvious way to do this is by
intemalising the transaction. Labour, however,  cannot be intemalised (that would  mean
slavery). The second  best solution seems to be the agreement on a long-term contract. The
wage in such a contract should be between the outside options for th-m  and employee. The
outside option for the worker is his fallback position outside the fïrm.  It is the wage that other
fírms  would want to pay for his services. Since the specific investment raised the productivity
of the worker only in this specific fïrm,  this outside wage is usually lower than his inside
wage. This outside wage (or marginal productivity of the worker before the investment) forms
the lower boundary of the inside wage. The outside option of the firrn is equal to the tost  to
hire a new employee and to train him until he has the same productivity leve1 as the
incumbent employee. The tost  of a new employee (the marginal productivity afier  the
investment) forms the upper boundary of the wage. As long as the wage is between these
outside options, it is efficient  for both parties to continue the relationship. This situation is
called “mutual hold-up” (Hashimoto, 1981). Both parties are not credible in their threats to
leave the relationship when the wage is in this corridor between the outside options. It is
efficient  for both of them to continue the relationship.
A solution for the hold-up problem could be that parties write  nomina1 contracts on the
distribution of the returns a priori, or with other words, parties fix  in a contract the nomina1
wage leve1 in the corridor between the outside options (also see MacLeod and Malcomson,
1993). To prevent the appearance of hold-up problems, it is stipulated that there wil1  be in
fïrst  instance  no renegotiations about the wage level. There wil1  be only renegotiations, when
one of the outside options becomes binding. In this way, inefficient  separations can be
prevented while the hold-up problem is suppressed.
A problem with this model is that it relies  on the assumption that both parties know each
respective  outside options. Although the model is restricted by this unrealistic assumption,
there is some evidente  that the model describes reality to some extent. Beaudry and DiNardo
(1991) show that the lowest unemployment rate since the start of a job has a strongly
significant upward effect on the current wage, which is considerably larger than the effects  of
the current employment rate, and the unemployment rate at the start of a job. The lowest
unemployment rate  can be considered to be the period with the most valuable outside options
for the workers, which, according to the model, should result  in upward adjustment of the
wage to prevent incumbent workers from leaving the firrn.
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The problems involved with the “shaky” assumption that both parties know each outside
options grow, when  the economy is hit by unexpected aggregate shocks. It could be assumed
that parties know how to handle with idiosyncratic shocks, but it seems less likely that this is
also the case for aggregate shocks. Two unfavourable situations can occur. First, there wil1  be
renegotiations of the contract and the employer is held-up. Second, the employer refùses to
renegotiate in fear of being held-up and ineffcient separation takes place. Both possible
situations lead to a lower than efficient  investment level. The micro  leve1 thus seems not to be
the right place to adjust nomina1 contracts to aggregate shocks.
A solution for this problem is to delegate the task of adjusting contracts to aggregate shocks to
corporatist organisations. By delegating the wage negotiations to a higher  level, the link
between bargaining power as a result  of specific  investments and the leve1 of specific
investments is broken.  Negotiators at the higher  leve1 are less prone to opporhmism. They
bargain over wage changes  for whole  industries, while the specific  investments vary per firm
and employee. Above that, unions  don’t want to put their relationship with the employer
associations at stake. Furthermore, we can say that “[alctive  corporatist intervention is
superior to mechanica1 adjustment rules,  as these rules  can never anticipate  al1 contingenties.
Rules  require shocks to be contractible, while for corporatist institutions shocks need only be
observable” (Teulings and Hartog, 1998). It is too costly to arrange  a contract that includes al1
eventualities and their remedies, ex ante, but it is always possible to adjust the contract after
some particular shock occurred.
Two types of labour unions
This way of contract adjustment by delegation to organisations at a higher  leve1  involves that
both unions  and employer organisations are trying to maximise  the joint surplus of both sides.
In the standard neo-classica1 models of union  behaviour, unions  only try to maximise  the
utility of their members. This may  describe the situation in decentralised economies  very  well,
but certainly not in economies  with a corporatist design (also see Teulings and Hartog, 1998).
In decentralised economies  in which no bargaining at a centra1 leve1 takes place, unions  have
an incentive to operate  in antagonistic ways. They strive to get the highest possible wages for
their members. On the short term, this fùlfïls best the wishes  of their members. Membership
of a union  is thus interesting for workers. These kind of unions  have an incentive to raise their
membership leve1 in firms  in which they are already active,  since this increases their
bargaining power. Threats of strikes or other obstructions of the work process become more
credible with higher  rates of membership. Firms wil1  react in hostile ways to this union
behaviour and do everything to prevent unions  fi-om  getting a solid base in their enterprise.
This leads to a scattered presence of unions  among firrns.  In some firrns,  they are very
powerful  and this makes it attractive  for employees to become and stay member, in other
fïrms,  they have hardly any  members and the management of these firms  prevents them from
growing.
In more corporatist societies with centralised wage bargaining, the strategy of unions  is
different. They have an incentive to maximise  the joint surplus by bargaining in ways as to
prevent hold-up problems. Because these negotiations lead to higher  efficiency of the
economy, employers carry a benevolent attitude towards these co-operative  unions.  The
labour unions  can demand  a portion  of the extra rents that result  from the increased efficiency
in the form of higher  wages. Economies  that are characterised by co-operative  unions,  show a
diffusion  of union  members over al1 industries, but with low average  union  density. Free-rider
problems are involved with this. To prevent hold-up problems, the results of the negotiations
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apply to al1 employees, so that union  membership does not offer the “carrot” of a higher
wage.
A second source of different incentives for these two types of unions  comes from the problem
of insider power. Co-operative unions  fee1 the pressure of their members to fírst  promise  the
employers a co-operative strategy, but, after  specifíc investments have been made, to use their
increased bargaining power to demand  a larger fraction  of the extra rents, which would mean
a switch to antagonistic practices.  This “insider power” can be kept under control,  when
membership is spread over different industies as is usually the case in corporatist societies.
Different members are then conf?onted  with different idiosyncratic shocks, which leads to a
minority of members that wishes  wage increases, being ruled out by a majority of members
that wants to save their reputation and keep on with maximising joint surpluses. This makes
unions  in corporatist societies credible (and unions  in decentralised countries incredible) in
their co-operative stance.
Trust involved
The mechanism  by which hold-up problems are prevented in corporatist economies  requires a
substantial amount of trust between the bargaining parties. Both parties, employer and
employee organisations, can fee1 the incentive to cheat. This problem can be seen as a
prisoners’ dilemma problem. The social optimum would be to co-operate, but there are short-
term incentives to defect. Why would parties trust each other? A first  reason can be found in
the value of a reputation of trustworthiness for a party. Having  such a reputation creates value,
because it stimulates other parties to engage  in mutual benefícial trust-related transactions.
The higher  the frequency of these transactions and the easier it is to recognise the
trustworthiness of the players, the more valuable the reputation becomes. Players wil1  thus be
very  careful  not to waste their reputation.
A second reason for mutual trust comes fiom  social norms. These can help to solve these co-
ordination problems by providing a focal point in the (re)negotiations about future wages
(also see Teulings and Hartog, 1998). The norms ensure that the beliefs about the out-of-
equilibrium behaviour of others are in place, and the others wil1  stick to the implicit contract
during the renegotiations process. Social norms also have an important fùnction  in making  the
individual fhrns  and workers accept the centrally bargained agreement as being a focal point.
The individual members must trust their representatives at the centra1 negotiations to have
bargained the best possible agreement for them. The representatives must trust that the
individual members wil1  support their bargained outcome. Without this mutual trust, the
system does not work. There is no sense in bargaining at a centra1 leve1 if the individual
employees and employers are not willing to accept the result.8.
A specifïc  norm that could offer such a focal point is faimess. The literature on
microeconomic experiments shows that unfair behaviour is usually reciprocated by severe
punishments, even when this creates some costs for the punishers themselves (see for example
Giith, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) and Camerer and Thaler (1995) for fïndings  of
negative reciprocity in ultimatum games, and Ostrom (2000) for a short overview of findings
in public good experiments). The bargained labour conditions wil1  therefore have to be
considered fair. The source of the norms of faimess differs between decentralised and
6 In the case of the Dutch metal sector, Poortvlied and Akkerman  (2000) conclude that most of the centra1
recommendations of the STAR appear at the agenda of CLA-negotiations  at the industy  and fum level.
Members of the STAR have in genera1 a positive judgement about how  their recommendations have worked
through into the resul ts  of  the CLA-negotiations.
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corporatist economies. In decentralised economies, the focus is entirely put on what happens
at the leve1 of the firm,  since information about shocks that occur at the aggregate leve1 is not
or insuffíciently known. So, the focal point wil1  also be perceived at the leve1 of the fírm and
rent sharing at this leve1 becomes the norm. In corporatist societies, the focal point is at the
macro leve1 where  corporatist organisations bargain over their “centra1 agreements”. With this
focal point of faimess, it is very  difficult for fïrms  to deviate and set their own standards
without facing the risk of retaliation.
The fíndings .of Gordon (1994) can be related to this. He shows some evidente  that
antagonistic labour relations can be associated with decentralised economies, and co-operative
relations with corporatist societies. In decentralised economies, the supervision intensity is
substantially higher  than in corporatist economies. The bargaining power of individual
employees is in the former probably put in check by supervision measures, whereas in
corporatist societies social norms and the delegation of power to higher  levels fulfíl this task.
Appropriateness of the hold-up model
Can the Dutch institutional context be linked to the hold-up model? The way in which wages
are yearly adjusted gives some evidente.  The structure  of the yearly wage increases in the
Netherlands fïts  very  neatly in the MacLeod and Malcomson contract model (also see
Teulings and Hartog, 1998: 271). A fírst  corresponding aspect is that the contracts  are written
in nomina1 terms.
The second  resemblance is the decomposition of the wage increases in three parts. The fïrst
part concerns the contractual experience and tenure  profíle.  Usually, every  employee gets a
yearly wage rise, because every  additional year of tenure  rises  him one step at some specifïed
fïxed-wage scale. This part of the wage increase can be seen as the contracted  wage increase
in period 1 for period 2 when no shocks occur. The second component of the wage increase is
negotiated by the corporatist organisations and consists of a fíxed  percentage increase for al1
wage scales. This is called the contractual initial increase, and can be seen in the model as an
adjustment to aggregate shocks that can be better handled by corporatist organisations than by
negotiations on the fh-rn  level. The last part of the wage increase are the incidental increases,
which is the set of increases not explained by components  one and two. These changes  are
negotiated at the micro  level. Notice that this component is zero for two thirds of al1 workers,
which is in line with the implications of the hold-up model.
Also corresponding with the hold-up model is the Ceedom of employers to set wages for new
hires. Wages for new hires are almost  never set at the lowest possible wage scales specified
by collective  labour agreements, but based on the subjective  interpretation of the capacities of
the new hire by the employer. When the new employee is settled in a specifïc wage scale, he
follows the yearly increases as is contracted by the corporatist organisations on the industry
level. In terms of the model, the micro  leve1 is best suited to value someone’s particular
capacities, a higher  leve1 is best suited to determine the appropriate wage increases as reaction
on aggregate shocks.
Other aspects of the model that are similar to the Dutch practice  are the long-term collective
labour agreements and extensions which are very  common in the Netherlands. They form an
institutional structure  in which employer and employee organisations can make long-term
agreements on the development of wage costs.  In the discussion of specifíc investments, we
have seen that it facilitates mutually advantageous trade, if ex-post bargaining power is
allocated to the party that carries  out important non-contractible investments. Applying this to
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the literature of search models, in which specifïc investments occur in the creation of
vacanties  and searching for jobs, the Hosios condition  tells US when  the search intensity of
workers and welfare of society are maximised (Hosios, 1990; Boone and Bovenberg, 2000).
This process hinges  on the relative bargaining power of workers and employers, which results
in the relative distribution of the rents. Too low bargaining power for workers implies low
search activity because of low wages, while too high bargaining power discourages
employees from looking for a job because the probability of fïnding one diminishes when
wages rise. Stating the division of rent in long-term contracts prevents the employers and
employees Com enlarging their bargaining power. Such a change in bargaining power would
mean that the ex-post leve1 of bargaining power would differ from the ex-ante optimal leve1 of
bargaining power with as a consequente  that the optimal distribution of rents would be
disturbed.
We may  conclude that the model of MacLeod and Malcomson that describes long-term
contracts as solutions for hold-up problems is relevant for the Dutch situation. We saw above
that delegation of wage bargaining to corporatist organisations even further  mitigates hold-up
problems when social partners act trustworthy in the bargaining process. Since we have seen,
in the previous section,  that the Dutch institutional framework consists of several trust
enhancing features, it seems appropriate to link these observations with the actual policy
measures that are held responsible for the economie  recovery. This is done in the next section.
5. Trust and the Dutch practice
This section  pays attention to the three policy measures that are considered to be mainly
responsible for the Dutch miracle. They wil1  be analysed in relation to the model of section 4
and the importante  of trust between the main  players. Before this, we focus on the Wassenaar
agreement, which is seen as the starting point for these new polities.
Wassenaar Agreemen t
The most fameus  agreement that is produced by the STAR is the centra1 agreement  of
Wassenaar in 1982. This agreement, in which wage moderation is coupled  to labour time
reduction, is seen as a turning point from the Dutch disease to the Dutch miracle. It marks the
moment that unions  and employer associations started realising that they had to co-operate  in
order to find a way out of the economie  crisis. Although the Wassenaar agreement was maybe
nothing more than a beacon of change - its text is rather  short and vague - after  it mutual trust
developed quickly and the agreement was followed by a string of other centra1 agreements. It
marked the beginning of an “ideological pacification”  between social partners (also see Van
Bottenburg, 1995: 199).
How did the agreement come  into being? As we saw before, the economie  situation in the
beginning of the 1980s was unsustainable. The unions  were not in a favourable position. They
were losing members in a fast way and the government was threatening to use wage measures
to get rid of the automatie  price  compensation rule (Van Bottenburg, 1995: 194). Especially
the threat of the govemment to intervene seems to have functioned  as a trigger mechanism  for
social partners to reach an agreement. The unions  reasoned that they would gain nothing if the
government intervened, but that they could expect something in exchange if they would reach
an agreement with the employers. The compensation the unions  sought (and got in the end)
was a redistribution of work. This redistribution, given shape as labour time  reduction, was
meant to fight  unemployment.
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It is noticeable that not only the unions  had an incentive to prevent govemment intervention in
the wage development. Also  the employer associations wanted to leave the government out of
the realm of labour market negotiations, although they had a different motive. The employers
were wary about the leve1 of ambition the government would attain to lower unemployment.
They feared that the govemment would copy policy measures implemented in France and
Belgium, where  govemments announced collective job plans and obligatory working time
reduction (also see Visser and Hemerijck, 1997).
Notice, however,  that the centra1 agreements, signed by the chairmen of the employer and
employee federations, are not binding for member unions  and associations, nor for individual
members. They just lünction  as a focal point for negotiations at lower levels about labour
standards. This is reflected in the names  given to the centra1 agreements. They vary from
“centra1 recommendations” (1982),  to “common policy framework” (1989), “social-economie
policy orientations” (1992) and “agenda for the discussion on collective labour agreements”
(1992).
Although these centra1 agreements of the STAR only put mora1 pressure on negotiating
parties at industry or firm level, this mora1 pressure has proved to be strong enough to change
the outcomes of labour negotiations to a large extent. The agreement of Wassenaar of 1982 is
illustrative. The Wassenaar agreement stated the importante  of restoring firm profitability
through wage moderation. Together with labour time  reduction, this should entourage
investments in employment. The agreement was very  short, written  in vague terms and not
legally binding. The results, however,  were impressive. In reaction to the Wassenaar
agreement, the govemment enacted a law that made it possible to open up al1 existing
collective labour agreements and to postpone the automatie  price  compensation. In one year,
about two thirds of al1 collective labour agreements had. been renegotiated. On average, the
price  compensation was postponed for two years and the average  working time  declined with
live percent. Between 1983 and 1985, the average  wage decreased in real terms by nine
percent (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). The labour income  ratio decreased from 95.3 percent
in 1982 to 81.5 percent in 1989.
An additional stimulus for the instrument of wage moderation came  from the CPB. More or
less as a coincidence, the CPB based its economie  policy analyses at the end of 1970s on a
vintage model in which the favourable effects  of wage moderation on employment were much
stronger than the negative income  effects  (Den Butter, 1991). According to the model, lower
labour costs would have a strong positive effect on the economy,  because it increased the
return on capita1 and would therefore postpone the replacement of machinery by more labour-
extensive ones. So in accordance to the model, the CPB already had “instructed” social
partners and govemment for some years, that wage moderation would be the most appropriate
measure to revive the economy.  It marked the end of Keynesian demand  policy.
A third important result  of the agreement of Wassenaar, besides the stimulus to ftuther  co-
operation between social partners and the start of a policy of wage moderation and work
redistribution, was the retreat of govemment from the realm of labour market negotiations.
This implied a drastic  break with the past. Before 1982, the govemment intervened ofien  and
in a direct marmer. In the nine years before the Wassenaar agreement, the govemment
intervened directly with wage measures in six respective  years. In the period afier  1982, the
government abstained from interference. It always followed the developments in labour
standards closely, but used the possibility of wage measures only as a trigger mechanism  to
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make sure that social partners would by themselves reach reasonable negotiation results’.
Although the govemment does not intervene anymore in a direct way in the field of labour
standards, it stil1 influences and supports developments that it considers favourable for the
economy. For example, the govemment supported the policy of wage moderation that social
partners had agreed on, by lowering taxes and premiums for social security. In this way, the
decline in purchase power of families was softened  and thus made the agreement more
acceptable  for workers. Another example is that when social partners agreed on redistribution
of work and ongoing liberalisation of the labour market, the govemment responded with a law
on flexibility in labour relations, thereby adapting the law to the changing preferences for
flexible working hours.
A background for the creation of the Wassenaar agreement can be found in the “sense of
urgency”-feelings  that arose in the beginnings of the eighties. The WRR and several
committees  wrote alarming reports about the state of the economy. A contibuting factor to
these “sense of urgency”-feelings  is the fact that policy makers know that the Netherlands are
a smal1 open economy and therefore rather  vulnerable in an intemational economie  context
(also see Katzenstein, 1985). The policy makers are aware of the fact that they don’t have the
possibility of protectionism  to guard their industries. The Netherlands are too smal1 to have an
impact on world economy, so it is the Dutch who wil1  have to change when the economie
environment changes.  This forms another element that forced the Dutch to develop problem
solving  ways of decision making  and inter  organisational co-operation  between govemment
and social partners in order to reach consensus about adjusting to changing economie
environments in flexible ways.
Policy measures
It is interesting to see how the theoretical considerations regarding the model of the labour
market of section  4 relate  to the three main  policy measures that are held responsible for the
Dutch miracle. First, the most important, as stated before, was the policy of wage moderation
in combination with the promise  of employers to invest  in employment. This can be seen as
the clearest example of a long-term  view of social partners and of a situation in which
bargaining power has not been used to disturb the distibution of rents. The fact that social
unrest, in the form of strikes, was extremely low by intemational standards (see fïgure  6),  can
be seen as a proof  that labour relations were healthy even after  two decades of sustained wage
moderation.
.
’ Since 1982 the govemment stil1 has the right to proclaim  a ceiling on wage rises,  but the law only allows for
these wage interventions in case the interests of the national economy require intervention because of sudden
extemal shocks to the economy.
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Figure 6: Annual average  of production days lost by strikes,
per 1000 workers (19824998)
600 1
Source: CBS. # missing data for 1982-1984,1986,  1987. * missing data for 1998.
The second important cause is found in the flexibilisation of the labour market. Notice that
both the fïrst  and second cause found support or maybe even originated in the Wassenaar
agreement. Although unions  used to oppose  flex work, during the eighties and nineties they
reached consensus with the employer organisations as how to organise the rights and duties of
flex workers. In 1999, a law on “Flexibility and security” came  into force, which provides  a
legal protection for flex workers. This attitude of willingness to adapt to a changing
environment is one of the reasons that flex  work took a high flight in the Netherlands.
Between 1970 and 1996, the number of part-time jobs increased with 1.2 million to 1.8
million and the number of flexible jobs increased with 500,000 in this period, whereas the
number of full-time jobs stabilised at 3.7 million (Hartog, 1999). The opportunity for flex
work thus made a huge  increase in employment possible. Again, consensus between social
partners and govemment were the basis of this development.
Reforms in social security are considered as the third cause. They lowered the replacement
rate and thus stimulated the search for work. Furthermore, they had a positive impact on
government fínances, and thereby on taxes and insurance premiurns. The lowering of taxes
and premiums was used as support for the policy of wage restraint. Social partners, however,
played a more dubious role in the field of social security. Attempts of the government to
create fïnancial incentives for sick and disabled workers to start working again, have been
systematically countered  by social partners. Decreases of the benefit  leve1 were al1 “repaired”
through collective  labour agreements8. Social partners also fìustrated  polities that were meant
to curb the volume of benefit  recipients. By having  a majority in the managing  boards of the
organisations that were responsible for the implementation, administration and control of the
social security system, they were able to grant easy access  to benefïts. The disability scheme
beczune  a “dump” for less productive  workers. This was an easy way for employers to
substitute older workers for younger, better-trained and cheaper ones, because employees
preferred the structural higher  benefïts  of the disability scheme  above those of unemployment,
8 Although the benefit  leve1 in case of sickness declined fiom 80 percent of the normal wage to 75 percent in
1985 and to 70 percent in 1986, collective  agreements made sure that sick employees received  a benefit  leve1 of
100 percent fiom the first day of sickness.
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and the bil1  was paid by society as a whole.  Reforms in 1994 and 1996 created a privatised
Sickness Insurance programme for employees. In 1995, as a “punishment” the administration
and operative control of unemployment, sickness and disability insurance was taken out of the
hands of social partners and given to independent institutes. Yet, high social security
expenditures for sickness and especially for disability (WAO) stil1 constitute  the major dark
side of the success of the Dutch Polder model. This problem wil1  even aggravate in future
with the fiu-ther rise in labour participation and the greying of the working age population (see
Scientific  Council for Govemment Policy, 2000; Den Butter and Hazeu,  2001). It is the
Donner-committee, referred to earlier, which has the task to’  initiate genuine institutional
reform that wil1  get suffïcient  politica1 support and support from the social partners.
6. Conclusion
In an intemational perspective, the Dutch economy  has shown a remarkable record of
employment and welfare growth, starting in the beginning of the eighties. This paper argues
that the Dutch culture of consensus formation constituted a major driving force for this
miraculeus  economie  recovery. The institutional framework for social-economie  policy
preparation displays various features that are in line with theories about trust-formation in
networks. Trust between the foremen of govemment and social partners have led to co-
operative long-term views on the economie  problems, which provided ample societal and
politica1 support for drastic  policy measures. In this way, the Dutch institutional fmmework,
with its specific  forma1 and informal consultation structure,  has fünctioned  as an intermediary
between trust at the micro  leve1 and macroeconomic performance of the country. The way in
which the interaction between scientific economie  analyses and policy making  is organised,
contributed to a major extent to the formation of trust and hence to societal support for policy
measures that were instrumental in the economie  recovery.
Of course, our paper is narrative in the sense that it describes the link between the success of
the Polder model and the role of networks, trust and institutions by a one case-study only. So
our study cannot be regarded as an empirical test of the relevante  of the theoretical
argumentation. As a matter of fact, such empirical test seems not feasible anyhow in
discussions of the influence of institutions on macroeconomic performance. There are no
“winning” institutional models as the social and historica1 background is different for each
country (see Freeman,  1998).
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